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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of agency design upon the perceived workplace conditions
within state agencies. Our research examines whether insulating features of agency structure
such as independent commission status, removal of officers only for cause, and fixed terms for
agency leaders are associated with perceptions by state agency managers that their work
processes and environments are free of micromanagement and interference from political actors.
Our data are drawn from the National Administrative Studies Project III, with additional
information collected from state agency web sites and statutes. We largely find that
administrators working within agencies headed by officials with fixed terms of service believe
that top management trusts employees much more than do employees in other agencies. They
also have much more pride in the agencies in which they work. We also find that agencies
having a commission structure have managers that are perceived to be willing to take risks.
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Agency Design and
State Administrators:
Political Insulation and
Managers’ Views of Their Workplace
Public agencies in the United States demonstrate a wide variety of structural design
characteristics, with some following a monocratic, Weberian bureaucratic pattern while others
display a more decentralized, less formalized structure. Some are set up to be responsive to
political superiors, while others are deliberately designed to be insulated in some fashion from
outside forces, whether they be clientele groups, regulated interests, or politicians themselves.
These various design features are often subject to debate and controversy at the time that the
agencies are created. Some observers, such as Terry Moe (1989), have said that these
bureaucracies are not designed to be effective. Instead, they represent the product of bargaining
and in-fighting between different interests within a policymaking body. Some interests may
demand some concessions with respect to the design of the agencies in return for supporting
particular policies that the agency will carry out. As a result, the agencies’ structures are a
bundle of compromises that may help or hinder policy implementation.
Whatever the impact on policy, agency design may have implications for how
government bureaucrats do their jobs and what experiences they have within their workplaces.
Structural features that may appear hierarchical and efficient in a Weberian sense may make the
bureaucratic workplace subject to the whims of a politically appointed agency head or prone to
capture by regulated interests. An agency that is headed by a board or commission with fixed,
staggered terms might be somewhat insulated from the petty tyrannies of one agency head, but
might still lack direction as the plural leadership of the agency squabbles among itself or fails to
maintain organizational discipline.
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Extant research is largely silent on how public administrators view their workplaces
within agencies of different organizational structure. While there is a large literature on job
satisfaction and organizational commitment among bureaucrats, there is next to nothing written
on how design attributes affect their experiences and assessments of their agencies. Satisfaction
and commitment are often treated as a function of particular HR policies, family-friendly
practices, pay scales, or public service motivation. This study is intended to fill this void.
The research reported here examines how aspects of the political insulation of state
agencies affects how public managers, technicians, and professionals view their organization and
immediate workplace. Specifically, we examine whether working in an agency headed by a
board or commission, independent of other agencies, with leadership holding fixed terms, has
any impact on what these bureaucrats think about their agencies. Much of the extant literature
on public agencies presumes that administrators desire and seek autonomy and an enhanced
reputation for their organizations (see Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter and Krause, 2012).

If

attributes of an agency structure promote the autonomy and reputation of an agency, they may
impact the perceptions that public employees have of their workplaces. We examine the impact
these attributes have on reported trust in agency leadership, pride in the organization, belief in
the high ethical standards of agency management, and the willingness of managers and
employees to take risk. We conduct this analysis using survey responses from the National
Administrative Studies Project III: A Survey of Managers in Public and Non-Profit
Organizations in Georgia and Illinois (NASP-III).
The paper proceeds as follows: The first section reviews the literature on efforts to
insulate bureaucratic agencies through institutional design. These efforts were largely intended to
prevent “capture” by clientele groups impacted by the actions of the agencies but were also
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sometimes intended to limit the role of political patronage and diminish the micromanagement of
public organizations by politicians. The literature on political insulation is briefly compared to
the research on job satisfaction and organizational commitment. The next section describes the
analysis of the NASP-III data to determine the impact that structure may have upon the
assessments of the respondents’ agencies with respect to the level of trust within the agency, the
pride they have in their organization, the ethical standards in their unit, and the degree to which
agency personnel are afraid to take risks. The results of this analysis are reported in the
following section. The paper concludes with some discussion of the implications of this analysis
and some suggestions regarding what future research could contribute to this topic.

Agency Design and the Public Workplace
The rise of independent agencies with a plural leadership in the form of a board or
commission became popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly in
agencies that performed regulatory and licensing functions. State utility commissions,
occupational licensing boards, civil service commissions all frequently took this organizational
form. In many cases, the boards and commissions had members who were appointed by an
executive to serve fixed and often staggered terms. Once appointed (often with legislative
confirmation), board members could be removed only for cause. Sometimes these agency board
members had to hold certain professional or occupational credentials and sometimes the enabling
statutes required that the board composition reflect some sort of partisan balance. This kind of
bureaucratic structure was often advocated by members of the Progressive movement, who felt
that this kind of institutional design discourages patronage appointment and limited the influence
of political actors. Arguably, this structure can protect bureaucratic discretion and insulating
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agency experts from intervention by politicians. The structure provides a credible commitment
that the politicians' hands are at least somewhat tied when they try to interfere in agency
operations (Miller and Whitford, 2016; Lewis, 2007).
In practice, however, it is not clear that this form of organization has insulated agencies
form political influence as much as proponents desired (Carpenter and Moss, 2014). Some of the
agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission that were often regarded as “captured”
by regulated interests had a commission structure. In any case, the effect that the structure has
upon day-to-day activities in the agency workplace have not really been examined. Any impact
on employee attitudes has largely been ignored. This research hopes to fill this void.
While agency structure has not been used as an explanatory variable in determining
employee attitudes and assessments, other variables have been documented as causal factors
affecting these outcomes. Research on trust and the public sector tends to focus on whether or
not the public has trust in the government (Kim, 2005). Carnevale and Wechsler (1992),
however, developed and tested a model of trust formation in public organizations, and found that
trust in organizations related to work-attitudes with the most important determinants are
established through the supervisors' attitudes in the work environment. Nyhan (2000) viewed
trust “from an internal organizational and an external environmental perspective” (p. 88). Where
most research focuses on external relationships (Downs, 1967; Gamson, 1968; Rockmon, 1981;
Wildavsky, 1980) or the trust relationship between the public and public institutions (Berman,
1997; Carnevale, 1995; Marlow, Nyhan, Arrington, & Pammer, 1994; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992;
Thomas, 1998), this research, which used data from a municipal government, concentrated on
the interpersonal relationship between supervisor and subordinate, which can affect behaviors in
organizations. The research found that by empowering employees and allowing them to

6

participate in the decision-making process, trust increases. With 2003 survey data from the
Georgia Department of Transportation, Feeney and Smith (2008) looked at the role of social
embeddedness in the perceptions of public managers on contractors. While the results
determined that managerial perceptions could be shaped to improve working relationships, this
research was not conducted between supervisor and subordinate, nor was it conducted in the
public sector.
While research can be found on trust within public agencies, studies of pride are rarely
found. Zegans (1992) held focus-group discussions with nine career civil servants from state or
local government on innovation in public agencies. In response to the question, “What motivates
bureaucrats to innovate?” (Zegans, 1992, 146), there was discussion on whether “pride of
ownership” was important. The group agreed that pride in work is important, but not pride as far
as taking credit for work. In reducing a million articles on organizational change to eight factors,
Fernandez and Rainey (2006) found pride was created in the organization’s history and success
by building internal support and overcoming resistance to change. In a study of private-sector
consumer complaint workers, Jin and Guy (2009) found several predictors of “feelings about the
level of work pride” (p. 98). The same variables that impacted job satisfaction (effects of
personal efficacy and emotion work), as well as being able to express different emotions, had a
positive effect on worker pride. Feeney and Boardman (2011) used the same National
Administration Studies Project III data as is used in this study in order “to understand what
individual-level characteristics correlate with highly positive worker perceptions of attitudes
towards government organizations” (p. 674), so that public organizations could “populate their
ranks with workers who harbor highly positive attitudes towards and perceptions of their
organizations” (p. 688). Both pride and high ethical standards were included in their definition
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of organizational confidence. Nevertheless, the literature does not examine how the structures of
an organization can affect employees’ sense of pride in the agency.
Woodrow Wilson expected that public administrators would display high ethical
standards; however, this is not always so. Burke and Black (1990), Bruce (1994), Menzel (1992,
1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1996b), in research on state and local governments, found that: 1) managers
and supervisors influence the ethics of employees, and therefore, on organizational performance;
and 2) the ethical climate of an organization has a positive effect on an organization’s
performance. Fattah (2011) questioned what is going right in the United States as, based on the
number of public employees, corruption and unethical behaviors are essentially kept in check,
and the US is considered one of the least corrupt systems in the world. Hassan, Wright, and
Yukl (2014) explored the consequences of ethical leadership and found that ethical leadership
did reduce absenteeism, as it had a positive influence on organization commitment.
Risk culture, as defined by Bozeman and Kingsley (1998), is “the organization’s
propensity to take risks as perceived by the managers in the organization” (p. 111); however,
they argue that perceptions define the culture, as opposed to “any tangible and documented set of
decisions or actions taken by organizational actors” (p. 111). Baird and Thomas (1985)
investigated the impact of particular variables on the tendency to take strategic risks, finding that
while individuals deciding to take risks is complex, it is even more complex for organizations to
formulate and realize risky strategies. Clark (2016) agreed with Bellante and Link (1981), Chen
and Bozeman (2012), and Dong (2014), that risk aversion in the public sector is a result of the
organizational environment; and Eckard (2014) that the reason the public sector is less averse is
their commitment to accountability. Notably, the prior research on trust, pride in the
organization, risk culture, and ethical standards has not focused on agency structure as a
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determinant of employee behavior or attitudes. The results of the analysis are reported in Tables
2 and 3.

Data and Methods
Data for this analysis comes primarily from the National Administrative Studies Project
(NASP-III), a project initiated by Barry Bozeman and continued by Bozeman and his
collaborators.

These data are drawn from responses to a mail survey to a random sample of

state-level public managers, upper-level professionals, and technicians in Georgia and Illinois.
The questionnaire includes a number of demographic, attitudinal, and motivational questions, but
also asks respondents to identify the organization in which they work. Our analysis is limited to
state government agency personnel, although there are some non-profit managers in the original
sample. After identifying the agencies of the respondents, the authors’ graduate assistants visited
the state web pages to collect data on agency design characteristics. The graduate assistants
coded agencies with respect to whether they were headed by a single director or by a board or
commission, with respect to whether they were employed in an independent agency or one
situated within another organization, whether the agency leadership served fixed or indefinite
terms and the length of the terms that were served. The coding scheme followed that used by
David E. Lewis in his study of federal agency design (2003). The presence of a design attribute
was coded as “1” while its absence was coded as “0”. The length of terms was coded as “0” if
there were no fixed terms, and as the number of years of term length otherwise.
The first dependent variable estimated was the response to a survey item indicating “Top
management displays a high level of trust in this organization’s employees.” High scores
indicated high trust with low scores indicating low trust. The second dependent variable
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examined was the response to a survey item indicating, “I feel a sense of pride working for this
organization.” The third variable estimated was the response to a survey item indicating “This
organization has high ethical standards.” We also estimated three measures representing the fear
of taking risks. The first of these was the response to survey items indicating that employees
were afraid of taking risks. The second indicated that managers were afraid to take risks. The
last was a measure we call “risk culture,” which is simply the sum of the two previously
described measures. The values for these dependent variables are estimated in models including
variables representing the agency design characteristics. The design characteristics used here are
the presence of a commission form of organization, independent agency status, fixed terms for
agency leadership, and length of terms for agency leaders. We also employed some basic control
variables, such as respondent age, whether the respondent was female, the full-time-equivalent
number of employees of the agency (FTE) as a measure of size, and whether the respondent
worked in a Georgia or Illinois state agency. Because the values for the FTE of agencies include
a number of outliers that might skew the results, the values were converted to natural log of the
original values. The estimates from models using logged values for FTE are not substantially
different from the results of analyses using non-transformed FTE, so the latter results are
reported in this paper. The descriptive statistics for these variables are listed in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
The analysis is conducted using ordinary least squares estimates of the responses to a
variety of survey questions, measured using a Likert scale. Other background variables for the
respondent and his/her agency were used in some preliminary models, but those results are not
reported here.
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Results
The level of explained variance in these models is relatively low, but the models as a
whole are still statistically significant. Of the theoretically interesting agency design variables,
the presence of fixed terms seems to be positively and significantly related to trust and pride in
the organization. An examination of standardized coefficients reveals that fixed terms are the
best predictor of trust values of any variable in the model. Term length, somewhat surprisingly,
is negatively and significantly related to those same variables. Whether the agency is run by a
commission and whether it is independent of a larger bureaucracy seems to make no substantial
difference with regard to manager’s attitudes. Working in a Georgia, rather than an Illinois, state
agency seems related to trust, pride, and high ethical standards. Older employees seem to have
more pride in their agencies and perceive that the ethical standards in their agencies are higher.
None of the structural variables have statistically significant impacts upon perceptions of ethical
standards
With respect to the fear of risk, both the commission organization form and the presence
of fixed terms for agency leaders seem to diminish fear of taking risks on the part of employees,
managers, or both. Again, we see a counterintuitive finding with respect to the length of terms.
This variable seems positively related to fear of risk in all three models. Women express less fear
of risk-taking in their organizations, as do older employees and the respondents in Georgia.
Size, represented by FTE, seems unrelated to fear of risk, although it appears to be related
consistently and negatively to trust, pride, and ethical standards.

Discussion
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From this analysis, we can make a few basic conclusions. First of all, size matters. The
larger agencies in terms of FTE seem to display much less trust, much less pride, and lower
ethical standards. However, size does not appear to have much impact upon fear of taking risks.
Exactly why size matters is not obvious. Prior research in organizational sociology (e.g., Blau
and Schoenherr, 1971) has found that larger organizations tend to be more hierarchical, rulebound, and formalized. Perhaps those characteristics are related to trust, pride, and ethical
standards. Perhaps smaller organizations are simply friendlier, more personal places in which to
work, which engenders positive feelings toward the agency. In any event, these results may give
one pause when pondering the benefits of consolidating multiple agencies into larger
departments.
Our results also indicate, as any good realtor knows, that location matters, too. The
respondents from the Georgia state agencies were generally much happier with their workplaces
than were the respondents from Illinois. It is not clear whether we should regard this as high
praise for Georgia or just an acknowledgment that state government in Illinois is deeply troubled.
We should acknowledge that the survey from which data were drawn for this analysis had
Governor Rod Blagojevich in office while the respondents filled out their questionnaires.
Perhaps now that Governor Blagojevich is a guest of the taxpayers in federal prison, Illinois state
employees will have a higher view of their workplaces. In light of the fiscal problems and the
budget stalemate facing that state, we rather doubt that their assessments would be wholly
positive.
Demographic characteristics of bureaucrats may make a bit of difference, too. Older
employees seem to have much more trust in their agency leaders, more pride in their agencies,
more belief in the ethical standards of their organizations, and much more confidence that their
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fellow employees and their managers are willing to accept risk. We do not know if this
represents a cohort effect or a simple life cycle effect, but it does indicate that older employees
see their workplaces differently from their younger colleagues. Gender also seems to matter.
Despite reports of sexual harassment and glass ceilings, the women in this sample tend to view
their workplaces somewhat more favorably than do men. Female respondents seem to have a bit
more pride in their agencies than do men. Women also perceive that employees in their agencies
are less likely to fear taking risks.
The primary variables of theoretical interest motivating this study were agency design
characteristics. These findings are a bit more complicated than expected. The commission form
of agency design is not related significantly to trust, pride, or perceived ethical standards.
However, it is significantly related to beliefs that managers are afraid to take risks. An even
stronger result can be found for the presence of fixed terms for agency leaders. This variable is
positively associated with trust and pride, as well as negatively related to perceptions that
employees are afraid to take risks. The commission format and the presence of fixed terms
(which is generally found with the commission format) may provide the security and sense of
autonomy that administrators and middle managers crave. Ironically, the longer leaders’ terms
are, the lower the pride and trust, and the more likely respondents were to believe that employees
are willing and able to accept risks. We do not have a good explanation for this result. Perhaps a
few outlier respondents from agencies with leaders with long fixed terms are affecting this
outcome.

It could also be the case that when agency leaders serve for long periods of time they

may feel both capable and willing of micromanaging their subordinates.
What stands out in this research is that agency structure does, at least sometimes, matter
in influencing how agency personnel view their workplace. Not every structural attribute
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matters, but it does appear that when agency leaders hold fixed terms, rather than be subject to
at-will dismissal, agency professionals trust their leaders more and have more pride in their
organizations. If trust and pride in the organization is a primary concern, one can make a strong
case for designing agencies in such a way as to insulate their leaders from removal by fixing
their terms of office (without making those terms too long). On the other hand, if the leadership
and management of chief executives is of paramount importance, one could argue for an
institutional design that makes agency leaders more responsive to elected officials (see Lewis,
2004).
Future research could examine the effect of insulating structural characteristics in other
states, rather than only two. Other attributes that could affect political influence and bureaucratic
autonomy could also be examined. These could include partisan balancing requirements for
agency boards and commissions, occupational or professional background mandates for agency
leaders, and provisions for legislative or executive review of agency orders.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Std. Deviation
Statistic
Age

N
Statistic

49.4427

8.91304

1204

.4545

.49813

1208

3525.7147

5703.10303

1125

Georgia

.5487

.49794

791

Commission

.4313

.49559

742

FixedTerms

.5709

.49527

783

Independent

.7487

.43403

780

TermLength

2.6347

2.58154

783

Female
FTE

Valid N (listwise)

18

689

Table 2
Variables

Trust
Coefficients
(t-ratios)

Pride
Coefficients
(t-ratios)

High Ethical
Standards
Coefficients
(t-ratios)

(Constant)

2.233

2.479

2.560

(8.072)

(10.711)

(9.805)

0.002

0.121

0.096

(0.028)

(1.949)

(1.369)

0.005

0.011

0.008

(1.070)

(3.022)

(2.012)

-2.482 E-005

-1.489 E-005

-1.374E-005

(-3.411)

(-2.450)

(-2.002)

0.351

0.411

0.607

(3.163)

(4.432)

(5.791)

0.220

0.121

-0.100

(1.205)

(0.792)

(-0.580)

-0.091

-0.042

-0.173

(-0.747)

(-0.409)

(-1.492)

0.512

0.292

-0.032

(3.302)

(2.251)

(-0.216)

-0.083

-0.080

-0.007

(-2.486)

(-2.861)

(-0.229)

Adj. R-Square

0.078

0.071

0.095

F-Statistics

8.183

7.514

10.009

Female

Age

FTE

Georgia

Commission

Independent

Fixed Terms

Term Length

19

Table 3
Variables

Employees’ Fear of
Risk
Coefficients
(t-ratios)

Managers’ Fear of
Risk
Coefficients
(t-ratios)

Risk Culture
Coefficients
(t-ratios)

(Constant)

3.285

3.116

6.330

(14.357)

(12.376)

(16.325)

-0.137

-0.114

-0.243

(-2.247)

(-1.692)

(-2.341)

-0.007

-0.008

-0.015

(-2.083)

(-2.035)

(-2.434)

3.747 E-006

2.226 E-006

7.146 E-006

(0.624)

(0.336)

(0.702)

-0.256

-0.172

-0.419

(-2.798)

(-1.706)

(-2.704)

-0.018

-0.459

-0.468

(-0.119)

(-2.766)

(-1.837)

0.077

0.074

0.174

(0.759)

(0.664)

(1.011)

-0.297

-0.193

-0.521

(-2.324)

(-1.368)

(-2.399)

0.057

0.082

0.145

(2.067)

(2.690)

(3.096)

Adj. R-Square

0.030

0.060

0.068

F-Statistics

3.597

6.421

7.103

Female

Age

FTE

Georgia

Commission

Independent

Fixed Terms

Term Length
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